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Crabtree: Crabtree: Illusory Rights

Illusory Rights: The Missouri Approach to
Employment Contracts
Main v. Skaggs Community Hospital'
I. INTRODUCTION

Does an employment contract give an employee contractual rights when
the contract allows for termination only upon "just cause," yet fails to specify
a duration of employment? In Main v. Skaggs Community Hospital, the
Southern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals concluded that pursuant to
the employment at will doctrine in Missouri, such agreements do not confer
contractual rights.2 This Note explores the history of the Missouri employment at will doctrine and the ramifications of the Main v. Skaggs Community
Hospital decision.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On February 1, 1988, Doug G. Main (Main) and Skaggs Community
Hospital (Skaggs Hospital) entered into what was ostensibly an employment
contract' for Main to work as a nurse anesthetist at Skaggs Hospital.4
Paragraph 1 of the contract stated that Skaggs Hospital "agrees to appoint the
Nurse Anesthetist for an indefinite period ... providing, however, that either
party may terminate this agreement, with just cause, by giving sixty days'
written notice by registered mail."5
Subsequently, Main was discharged from employment.6 Main sued
Skaggs Hospital under several theories. In particular, Count I claimed that
Main met all contractual obligations imposed by the contract and that Skaggs
Hospital breached the contract by discharging him without just cause.7 A tB
trial level, Skaggs Hospital filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
which the trial court granted as to Count 1.8 The trial court held that because
there was no stipulated period of time in the contract, the dontract merely

1. 812 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
2. Id. at 189.
3. It was not alleged that the document in question was not an employment
contract. Id. at 185-86.
4. Id. at 185.
5. Id. at 186.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 185-86.
8. Id. at 186.
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created "an at will employment relationship which entitled [Skaggs Hospital]
to terminate Plaintiff without cause, notwithstanding the language of paragraph
I of said contract .... 119
In granting the motion for Skaggs Hospital, the trial court "made an
express determination that... there was no just reason for delay in entering
[the judgment]."10 An appeal to the Southern District of the Missouri Court
of Appeals followed."
The court of appeals concluded that because the contract continued for
an indefinite period of time, it imposed "an obligation in perpetuity." 2 The
court noted that obligations of perpetuity were "condemned in Paisley and
Superior Concrete." 3 Therefore, the contract in question created only an
employment at will relationship,
and Skaggs Hospital could discharge the
14
cause.
without
plaintiff
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. General Background
The employment at will doctrine creates a presumption that an employment relationship is terminable at the will of either the employer or the
employee.' 5 Hence, an employer can discharge an employee "for
good
16
cause, no cause, or bad cause without incurring any legal liability."'
Originally, American courts followed one of three means of determining
the length of an employment relationship: (1) they presumed a period of one
year according to English common law; (2) they determined the length of
employment based on the time of payment; or (3) they presumed employment
was terminable at will. 7 Horace Wood's treatise of master and servant law

9. Id. at 187.
10. Id.
at 185.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 189.
13. Id. (citations omitted). In Paisley v. Lucus, 143 S.W.2d 262, 271 (Mo. 1940),
the court actually held that an obligation for life would only be upheld "where the
intention, that the contract's duration is for life, is clearly expressed in unequivocal
terms." In SuperiorConcrete Associates, Inc. v. Kemper, 284 S.W.2d 482, 490 (Mo.
1955), the court held that a contract for an unspecified amount of time only created
an employment at will relationship.
14. Main, 812 S.W.2d at 197.
15. Peter S. Partee,Reversing The PresumptionofEmploymentAt Will, 44 VAND.
L. REv. 689, 689 (1991).
16. Id. at 689-90.
17. Murray Tabb, Employee Innocence and the PrivilegesofPower: Reappraisal
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printed in 1877 is generally credited with the development and wide8
acceptance of the employment at will doctrine in the United States.
Wood's treatise stated:
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring,
the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day,
week, month, or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring and
no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate
fixed for whatever time the party may serve.' 9
Although the cases that Wood relied on did not support the employment
at will doctrine as stated above, 20 the theory was readily accepted by the
great majority of states.21 One reason suggested for this acceptance is that
the doctrine suited the needs of "an emerging industrial nation where the
economic concept of laissez-faire ruled supreme in the business and intellectu'
al world."2
Another rationale for the employment at will doctrine is that the
employee-employer relationship is one of agency2' rather than contract
law.2 4 The relationship of principal and agent is primarily consensual in
nature.'
Because an agent can bind a principal, there is a need for
protection of the principal.26 The employment at will doctrine provides that
protection by making the relationship terminable at the will of either party.
This is not to say, however, that parties cannot specifically contract to limit
the reasons for discharge. The issue in these cases almost always turns on

of Implied Contract Rights, 52 Mo. L. REV. 803, 804 n.2 (1987).
AND

18. Id. at 805 n.2 (citing HORACE WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877)).

OF MASTER

19. WOOD, supra note 18, § 134 (quoted in Timothy J. Heinsz, The Assault on
the EmploymentAt WillDoctrine: Management Considerations,48 Mo. L. REV.855,
859 (1983)).
20. Cornelius J.Peck, PenetratingDoctrinal Camouflage: Understandingthe
Development of the Law of Wrongful Discharge,66 WASH. L. REV. 719, 722 (1991).
21. Id.
22. Sami M. Abbasi et al., Employment-at-will: An Eroding Concept in
Employment Relationships, 38 LAB. L.J. 21, 23 (1987).
23. Heinsz, supra note 19, at 860 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2
cmt. a, § 25 (1958)).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 860-61.
26. Id.
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whether the purported contract gives rise to contractual rights such that the
employer must have just cause to discharge the employee. 27
Where a written contract of employment exists, "the courts have analyzed
the employee's status in contractual terms."' In doing so, the courts have
sometimes required mutuality of obligation and/or separate consideration to
support a contractual limitation on the right to discharge. 29 The mutuality
of obligation doctrine states that unless both parties to a contract are bound,
neither is bound.30 The separate consideration test requires consideration
beyond the employee's performance of his or her duties.3 '
However, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts expressly rejects
mutuality of obligation as necessary for a binding contract.3 Likewise, the
Restatement rejects the necessity of separate consideration by recognizing that
one promise is sufficient consideration for any number of covenants. 3 As
a result, two distinct lines of reasoning have developed. A number of courts
still adhere to the separate consideration requirement, but the majority of
courts have adopted a "more flexible approach in deciding which benefits to
the employer and detriments to the employee are sufficient to bind the
employer to an obligation to discharge the employee only for cause."34
In recent years numerous legislative limitations on the employment at will
doctrine have been promulgated.35 In addition, courts in a number of
jurisdictions have begun to carve out exceptions to the doctrine.3 6 These

27. Robin V. Foster, Comment, Employment at Will: When Must an Employer
Have Good Causefor Dischargingan Employee, 48 Mo. L. REV. 113, 117 (1983).

This is true for an implied contract as well. Id. at 118.
28. Heinsz, supra note 19, at 865.
29. Id.

30. Tabb, supra note 17, at 819.
31. Id. at 815-16.

32. Id. at 819. The Restatement states that "[ilf the requirement of consideration
is met, there is no additional requirement of ...mutuality of obligation." Id. at 819

n.53 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981)).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTs § 80 cmt. a (1981) (stating that
because consideration does not have to be of equal value, "two or more promises may
be binding even though made for the price of one."). See also Tabb, supra note 17,
at 817.
34. Foster, supra note 27, at 119.
35. For a complete discussion of the statutory remedies and a listing of federal
and state statutes limiting termination, see JOHN C. MCCARTHY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES
IN WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CASES 277-306 (1985).
36. See Tabb, supra note 17, at 806 (defining three limitations courts have
imposed on the employment at will doctrine); see also Partee, supra note 15, at 690
("In recent years the at-will doctrine has suffered substantial erosion as a common-law
principle. A vast majority of state courts have fashioned various tort- and contract-law
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exceptions have generally been in response to "the doctrine's inherent
potential for employer abuse. 3 7 Because the employment at will doctrine
gives the employer the absolute power to discharge an employee, the doctrine
has often sponsored discharges which are arbitrary or contrary to public
policy. 38 The legislatures and courts have struggled with trying to find a
balance between continued protection of the employer and recognition that the
employee should often have some minimal protection from arbitrary or unjust
discharges.
The earliest exceptions to the employment at will doctrine came from
legislatures. 39 There are essentially two categories of legislative intervention
in this field. 4' The first is legislation which specifically denies the ability to
discharge for stated reasons. 41 The National Labor Relations Act of 1935,
for instance, was one of the first statutes to chip away at the employment at
will doctrine. It prohibited, among other things, termination for association
with a union. 4' Likewise, federal statutes aimed at reducing employment
discrimination have been promulgated. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
"prohibit[s] all employers from discharging an employee for various reasons,
including race, color, religion, sex, national origin ....and age., 43 The
second category of legislative intervention in the employment at will context
is legislation that specifically limits an employer's ability to discharge an
employee unless good cause exists."4 This has resulted in litigation regarding
what constitutes "good cause."
The judicial exceptions to the employment at will doctrine include both
contract and tort theories. 45 The contract theories can be separated into two
categories:46 first, recognition of an implied covenant of good.faith and fair
exceptions in a piecemeal attempt to diminish the doctrine's inherent potential for
employer abuse."); Peck supra note 20, at 734-35 (claiming that while courts have
substantively changed employment law, they continue to use, and consequently stretch
the meaning of, the original terminology).
37. Partee, supra note 15, at 690.
38. Abbasi et al., supra note 22, at 21 (noting that one study estimated "private
industry discharges 1,000,000 employees each year without a fair hearing and that
between 100,000 and 200,000 employees are unfairly terminated each year.").
39. JAMES N. DERTOUZOS ET AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
at v (1988).
40. Partee, supra note 15, at 700-01.
41. Id.
42. Foster, supra note 27, at 118. See 29 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988).
43. Foster, supra note 27, at 115-16.
44. See Partee, supra note 15, at 701 and statutes cited within. E.g., MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 39-2-901, -914 (1987); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 76-79 (Supp. 1990).
OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION

45. Peck, supra note 20, at 735.
46. Id.
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dealing within employment contracts; 47 and second, an implied contract
exception which relaxes the evidentiary standard required to show that an oral
contract exists.48 Along with these exceptions, courts have also been less
likely to find that separate consideration and/or mutuality of obligation are
required to enforce a-provision of an employment contract.4 9
A number of states now recognize a cause of action in tort for wrongful
discharge.50 The most prevalent tort theory is discharge which is contrary
to public policy. 51 This theory recognizes that "an employer cannot dismiss
an employee for reasons that undermine a firmly established principle of
public policy." 52 However, the limits of the public policy exception are
unclear. Some states limit the exception to policies expressed in a statute or
constitution, while other states interpret the exception as encompassing much
broader policy. 53 The most extreme approach is to let the jury decide
whether a public policy exists."5
A number of other tort theories have been recognized in the wrongful
discharge context.5 5 These theories include intentional infliction of emotional
harm, interference with contractual relations, fraudulent misrepresentation,
defamation, prima facie tort, and conspiracy.56
In a number of jurisdictions, a contract with a just-cause provision is
enforceable even though it fails to state a duration of employment.57 Most
of the courts in these jurisdictions conclude that a just-cause provision limits
the employer's ability to discharge an employee. According to one commentator, "[T]he employer's power to terminate may be limited either by

47. Partee, supranote 15, at 699. Courts are unsure of the effect of the covenant
if it does exist. Id. The covenant has been interpreted broadly in Cleary v. American
Airlines, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), to prohibit the discharge of an
employee who had worked for 18 years, but also interpreted more narrowly to only
prohibit bad cause firings. Partee, supra note 15, at 699.
48. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich.
1980) (finding implied covenant in policy manual and oral representations by
employer). For a complete discussion, see also Peck, supra note 20, at 735-36; Tabb,
supra note 17, at 813.

49. See Tabb, supra note 17, at 816, 819.
50. Foster, supra note 27, at 128.
51. Partee, supra note 15, at 693. Forty-three states have adopted some form of
the public policy exception. Id. at 693 n.33.
52. Abbasi et al., supra note 22, at 24.
53. Partee, supra note 15, at 695.
54. Id. (referring to Cilley v. New Hampshire Ball Bearings, Inc., 514 A.2d 818
(N.H. 1986)).
55. See generally McCARTHY, supra note 35, at 250-75.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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establishing a contract for a definite term or by contractually providing for a
58
limitation on the employer's power without establishing a term. 0
B. MissouriLegal Background
Missouri courts have long recognized the employment at will doctrine. 9
In Christy v. Petrus,60 the Missouri Supreme Court stated, as a wellestablished rule, "that in the absence of a contract for employment for a
definite term or a contrary statutory provision, an employer may discharge an
employee at any time, without cause or reason, or for any reason
and, in such
61
case, no action can be maintained for wrongful discharge.",
In Dake v. Tuell,62 the supreme court specifically rejected the prima
facie tort doctrine as a cause of action by an employee at will against his
employer.6 In Dake, the plaintiffs were allegedly terminated for informing
the employer "that other employees... were making fraudulent misrepresentations to customers." 64 The court stated that plaintiffs cannot "maintain a
suit for wrongful discharge against their former employers by cloaking their
claims in the misty shroud of prima facie tort."6 The court appeared to
denounce any cause of action for wrongful discharge unless based on a
contract or a statute.6 The court stated that "unless there is a contrary
statutory provision upon which to base his claim, an at-will employee must set
forth in his petition for wrongful discharge 'the"61 essential elements of a valid
contract, and a discharge in violation thereof.'
In the early 1980s a number of claims based on the implied contract
exception to employment at will found favorable results in the appellate courts
of Missouri.' In 1988, however, the Missouri Supreme Court in Johnson

58. Id. at 201 (emphasis added). See also Mansell v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 137
S.W.2d 997, 999-1000 (rex. Civ. App. 1940) (stating just cause standard "obviously"
limited employer's ability to discharge).
59. Heinsz, supra note 19, at 857.
60. 295 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1956).
61. Id. at 124; accordAmaan v. City of Eureka, 615 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Mo.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981).

62.
63.
64.
65.

687 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1985).
Id. at 193.
Id. at 192.
Id.

66. Id. at 193.

67. Id. (quoting Maddock v. Lewis, 386 S.W.2d 406, 409 (Mo. 1965)).
68. See, e.g., Enyeart v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 693 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985) (recognizing that implied contracts can be formed from language in personnel
handbook and that any contractual ambiguities are to be construed against the
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v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.6 9 reaffirmed the employment at will doctrine

in relation to the implied contract.70
In Johnson, the court reiterated that "for an at will employee to state a
claim for wrongful discharge, he must plead 'the essential elements of a valid
contract, and a discharge in violation thereof. ' '7 1 Those elements include
"offer, acceptance and bargained for consideration."' The court decided that
McDonnell Douglas' actions of publishing a handbook did not constitute a
contract giving contractual rights to its employees. 73 Rather, "[a]n
employer's offer to modify the at will status of his employees must be stated
with greater definiteness and clarity than is found here." 74 Because no
contract was formed from the employee handbook, the court concluded that
the employment was at will, and consequently could be terminated without
cause.

75

The Johnson court also specifically rejected the opportunity to expand
Missouri's recognition of the public policy exception. 76 The court made
clear that unless the policy "has the benefit of a constitutional provision, a
statute, or a regulation based on a statute," it will not support a claim for
wrongful discharge. 77
IV. INSTANT DECISION

The crux of Main's argument Was that the "just cause" provision in the
employment contract limited the reasons for which he could be discharged;

employer); William C. Martucci & Georgann H. Eglinski, Recent Developments in
Missouri: Wrongful Dischargeand Related Actions, 57 UMKC L. REV. 665, 667

(1989) (citing Arie v. Interthem, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 142 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983)
(recognizing implied contract exception to employment at will)).
69. 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988).

70. Id. at 663. See also Martucci & Eglinski, supra note 68, at 667.
71. Johnson, 745 S.W.2d at 662 (quoting Dake, 687 S.W.2d at 193).
72. Id.

73. Id. at 662-63.
74. Id. at 662.
75. Id. at 663.

76. Id. ("The Court does not deem it necessary to engraft a so-called 'public
policy' exception onto the employment-at-will doctrine.").
77. Id. The court distinguishes: "Smith v. Arthur C. Baue Funeral Home, 370
S.W.2d 249 (Mo.1963) (discharge of an employee for asserting the constitutional right
to choose collective bargaining representatives); Boyle v. Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700
S.W.2d 859 (Mo.App. 1985) (employee discharged for refusing to violate federal Food
and Drug Administration regulations); Beasley v. Affiliated Hospital Products, 713
S.W.2d 557 (Mo.App. 1986) (employee discharged for refusing to violate false

advertising and federal mail fraud statutes)."
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therefore, he was not an employee at will.78 Main also argued that there was
an exception to "the general rule that it-will employment can be terminated
by either party without cause." 79 Main's third argument contended the
employment contract was ambiguous.*
Skaggs Hospital argued that because there was no specific duration of
time stated in the contract, Main was merely an employee at will and therefore
could be terminated without just cause.81
Main's first argument, that the "just cause" provision limited the reasons
for discharge, is supported in the dissent in Johnson v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp.' To address Main's first point, the court analogized to Haith v.
Model Cities Health Corp. of Kansas City.m In Haith, the plaintiffs had an
employment contract stating that the contract "may be terminated at any time
by ... mutual consent ... ."' The contract provided a number of other
reasons for which it could be terminated.85 The plaintiffs argued that the
mutual-consent clause limited the reasons for discharge; consequently, the
employment at will doctrine did not apply."
The Haith court focused on the fact that there was no duration of time
stated in the contract8 7 In addition, the court referred to other Missouri
cases in which employment contracts did not have a stated duration of time
and were held to create an employment at will relationship, even though they
had a "termination by mutual consent" clause. 8 However, the Haith court,

78. Main, 812 S.W.2d at 189.
79. Id. at 188.
80. Id. at 189.
81. Id. at 186.
82. 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988) Judge Blackmar states:
It is perfectly possible for an employer to enter into a contract with his
employees, in which the employer promises continued employment, so long
as business circumstances permit, and agrees to discharge only for cause.
Most contracts negotiated with unions are of this nature. There is no reason
why a similar contract could not be entered into with unorganized
employees.
Id. at 664-65 (Blackmar, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (citing Haith, 704 S.W.2d 684 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)).
84. Haith, 704 S.W.2d at 685.
85. Id. at 688. The contract could be terminated "by (1) mutual consent; (2) the
death of one of the [plaintiffs]; (3) for failure of one of the [plaintiffs] to maintain
licensure; (4) for behavior of one of the [plaintiffs] disruptive to the [defendant], (5)
for failure by the [plaintiffs] to meet their professional responsibilities; or (6) for
permanent disability of one of the [plaintiffs]." Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 686-87.
88. Id. at 686. The other cases the court cites are Paisley v. Lucas, 143 S.W.2d
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in distinguishing the case from Drsewiecki v. H & R Blocks9 (a case on
which the plaintiffs in Haith relied), was careful to point out that no condition
of termination solely for cause appeared in the contract.'
The Haith court,9' as well as the court in Main,9 relied on Paisley v.
Lucas93 and Superior ConcreteAccessories, Inc. v. Kemper.94 The contract
at issue in Paisley stated that it would "not be canceled or modified, except
by mutual agreement ...

."9

The court held that although contracts in

perpetuity would be upheld if the "intention, that the contract is for life, is
clearly expressed in unequivocal terms,"9 the contract at issue
was for an
97
indefinite period of time and was therefore terminable at will.

Likewise, a distributor's sales agreement in SuperiorConcrete contained
a clause stating it would not be canceled except by "mutual agreement.""
The court held that the duration of employment was indefinite; consequently,
the contract was terminable at will.?
The court also cited Christy v. Petrus'° for the proposition that "in the
absence of a contract for employment for a definite term or a contrary
statutory provision, an employer may discharge an employee at any time,
without cause or reason, or for any reason and, in such case, no action can be
maintained for wrongful discharge."' 1

262 (Mo. 1940) and Superior Concrete Accessories, Inc. v. Kemper, 284 S.W.2d 482
(Mo. 1955).
89. 101 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
90. Haith, 704 S.W.2d at 686-87. The court stated "no such condition [of
termination only for cause] is in the contract in the present case, and therefore it must
be held that the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment against plaintiffs
."Id. at 687.
91. Id. at 685-86.
92. Main, 812 S.W.2d at 186-87.
93. 143 S.W.2d 262 (Mo. 1940).
94. 284 S.W.2d 482 (Mo. 1955).
95. Paisley, 143 S.W.2d at 269.
96. Id. at 271.
97. Id.
98. Superior Concrete, 284 S.W.2d at 489. The court noted that although an
employment contract was not the same as a distributor sales agreement they were
essentially the same in relation to power to terminate. Id.
99. Id. at 490. Note that the plaintiffs in SuperiorConcrete cited Harrington v.
Kansas City Cable Railway Co., 60 Mo. App. 223 (1895) in an attempt to show
separate consideration for the agreement not to cancel by mutual consent. The court,
however, held that there was not sufficient separate consideration, SuperiorConcrete,
284 S.W.2d at 491.
100. 295 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1956).
101. Main, 812 S.W.2d at 194 (citing Christy, 295 S.W.2d at 124).
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The court concluded that the employment contract between Main and
Skaggs Hospital was for an indefinite period.'02 The court stated, "It is
therefore a contract imposing an obligation in perpetuity, condemned in
Paisley ... and Superior Concrete ... ,13 Hence, Main was considered

an employee at will. 4
To support his second argument, Main cited Hall v. St. Louis-San
FranciscoRailway. Co. '05 In Hall, the court held that a discharge procedure
contained in a collective-bargaining agreement was enforceable even though
the employee was not employed for a definite period of time.'1 6 The
Missouri Supreme Court later cited Hall in Craig v. Thompson17 "as
authority for the proposition that under an agreement or contract between a
railway labor union and an employer, an employee coming under the contract
may recover if his discharge was wrongful, even though engaged for only an
indefinite period."'"
However, because there was no evidence of wrongful discharge in Craig,
the judgment was reversed.1' 9 Therefore, the Main court found "the
proposition for which Hall was cited in Craig was arguably unnecessary,
hence dictum." 1 In addition, the court cited Maddock v. Lewis"' for the
proposition that collective bargaining agreements are distinct from employment contracts." 2
Finally, the court cited Dake v. Tuell1 as the last controlling decision
of the Missouri Supreme Court on employment at will." 4 In Dake, the
court held that there is no action for wrongful discharge in Missouri unless the

102. Id. at 189 ("It purports to grant plaintiff the right to perpetual employment
by Hospital unless plaintiff's performance becomes deficient enough to constitute 'just
cause' for firing him.").
103. Id. (citations omitted).
104. Id.
105. 28 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930).

106. Main, 812 S.W.2d at 195. In Hall, the court stated, "We do not think [the
rule of employment-at-will] is so absolute and so technical as to nullify and make void
an agreement not to discharge an employee without an investigation. . . ."
Id. (quoting
Hall, 28 S.W.2d at 689).
107. 244 S.W.2d 37, 41 (Mo. 1951).

108. Main, 812 S.W.2d at 188.
109. Id.

110. Id.
111. 386 S.W.2d 406 (Mo. 1965).
112. Main, 812 S.W.2d at 188-89 (citing Maddock, 386 S.W.2d at 410-11).

113. 687 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1985).
114. Main, 812 S.W.2d at 189.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 10

1030

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

claim falls within a statutory provision.1 5 Therefore, even if Hall and Dake
do conflict with each other, the court was "constitutionally bound by the last
6
controlling decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri.""
The court summarily rejected Main's argument that the contract was
ambiguous as to duration, which would have given him an opportunity to
present evidence of the ambiguity." 7 In rejecting Main's contention, the

court concluded that the contract attempted to give rights in perpetuity and
The court stated,
created an employment at will relationship. 8
"[Consequently, there is no ambiguity requiring evidentiary explanation." '
V. COMMENT
Suppose a potential employee has two job offers from two different
companies-both willing to give employment contracts. The first company's
contract states that the employer agrees to hire the employee for one year.
The second company's contract states that the employer will only terminate
the employee for "just cause." The future employee wishes to work for the
company that offers greater job security. Which of these contracts appears to
offer more job security to someone who has not studied Missouri law relating
to employment contracts?
Missouri's tenacious adherence to the employment at will doctrine is
disturbing in the case at bar. The Main decision results in illusory rights. As
exemplified in the hypothetical above, an employee predictably will rely on
the language of an employment contract without realizing that the words are
meaningless because of judicial construction.
The very term "terminable at will" is inconsistent with a contract that
allows termination only upon "just cause." Logic mandates that if the reasons
for discharge are limited, an employer cannot discharge someone for any
reason. To hold otherwise either defeats the intentions of the parties in
making the contract, or rewards an employer for misrepresenting job security
to an employee.
In addition, the employee is in the worst position to know and understand
that a provision in the contract purporting to establish a "just cause" standard
for discharge is unenforceable. Not only is the employee usually the one with

115. Id. "[l]t is firmly established in Missouri that absent a contrary statutory
provision, an at will employee cannot maintain an action for wrongful discharge
against his former employer." Id. (citing Dake, 687 S.W.2d at 192-93).
116. Id. (citing Mo. CONsT. art. V, § 2).
117. Id.

118. id.
119. Id.
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lower bargaining power, but the employee is also the least likely to have
meaningful access to legal knowledge.
The problem with the employment contract in Main is that if the court
gave the words of limitation effect, the contract could conceivably create an
obligation in perpetuity (as long as Main competently performed). The court
finds that this possibility is determinative of the issue. However, it is
questionable whether the possibility of an obligation in perpetuity should be
the deciding factor in this case.
There are three possible explanations for the use of this contract by
Skaggs Hospital: first, Skaggs Hospital may have intended to create an
obligation to hire Main for as long as he competently performed; second,
Skaggs Hospital may have known that the words "with just cause" were
meaningless, but wanted to represent to the employee that the position had
more job security than it actually did; third, and most likely, the contract was
poorly drafted.
If Skaggs Hospital intended to create an obligation for as long as Main
competently performed, then there is no reason not to give the words of
limitation effect. If Skaggs Hospital intended to give the impression of job
security, then the words of limitation should be given effect as a matter of
public policy. Finally, if the contract was poorly drafted, the next question is
who should bear the responsibility for the bad drafting. The court seems to
have chosen the employee to bear this burden.
A better rule may be to recognize that a "just cause" provision in an
employment contract does limit the employer's rights to discharge an
employee, regardless of whether a duration of employment is stated in the
contract.
This would impose the burden of proper drafting on the
employer who created the contract and who is usually in a position of superior
bargaining power.
This would not create sweeping change in the employment at will
doctrine. The only case that would be affected is the situation in which the
employer specifically contracts to limit the reasons for discharge. If an
employer is willing to create a contract which includes a "just-cause"
provision but fails to state a duration of employment, the employer should also
be willing to pay the consequences for breaching that contract.
The larger question facing Missouri is whether it is wise to continue to
adhere to a strict construction of the employment at will doctrine if a written
contract limiting the reasons for discharge does not exist. It is questionable
whether the policy considerations which led to the acceptance of the
employment at will doctrine are still applicable in the present employment
context.

120. A number of courts have taken this approach. See supra note 57.
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On the other hand, it is not easy to come up with a solution that protects
both the employer's flexibility and the employee's expectation of job security.
In other jurisdictions, courts have struggled with how to protect those
competing interests without creating unjust situations for employers.
Redefining a concept or creating a new rule is never without problems. One
commentator has stated, "It is an open question
whether the judicial 'cures'
21
are better than the common law 'disease.'0
Regardless, Missouri courts are not yet willing to embark on the process
of redefining the employment at will doctrine. Both Johnson and Dake
evidence an intention by the Missouri Supreme Court to hold fast to a clear
rule of law which prohibits wrongful discharge actions unless based on statute
or contract. Main represents the furthest extension of that intent. The
construction of the employment contract in Main creates a degree of certainty
in the law. However, that certainty may be coming at the expense of the
expectations of the otherwise unprotected employee.
JAMES M. CRABTREE

121. Foster, supra note 27, at 136.
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